Pour la Finlande

Rectification: yes, in reality, Pressense is the conscious or unconscious auxiliary of the vast turning movement being organized throughout France in order to form a “great republican party” for some “great ministry.”

What is the “dear friend” of M. de Pressense doing in the meantime? He is supporting the turning movement in question as best he can. Meanwhile, to better moralize the masses, he writes a two-column apology for “good bourgeois cooking” (Petite Republique, June 20) --- a theme evidently full of relevance in a newspaper that presents itself as the organ of the starving and where the word “proletariat,” at the very least, is the object of tender developments; or else he glorifies England (Petite Republique, June 26). Anxious in his turn to justify the master’s word: “We are not ascetics,” M. Gustave Tery identifies primitive Christianity with a vast enterprise of laziness; he writes this stupefying axiom: “One can picture the primitive Christian as a lazzarone of the South.” There is the public well informed! Christianity was an oppressor of conscience --- that is why we detest it. But one must not slander one’s adversaries. In any case, one is obliged to know the subjects one treats. Without referring M. Tery to the Church Fathers, nor even to a superficial reading of the Acts of the Apostles or the Epistles of Saint Paul, the public may be astonished that an agrege of the University should have so imperfect a knowledge of Pascal and especially of Bossuet as to offer so fanciful a portrait of primitive Christianity.

One sees from these examples, which we could multiply, what profit the people must derive from reading the Petite Republique! Jaures is wrong to believe that the struggle against the “Social-Lucullus” is “almost extinguished.” It is not because one voice has fallen silent… momentarily that all of us are going to abdicate our consciences and cease to keep our eyes on our leaders and their newspapers. And why still say “our leaders”? Let us leave them to those who need to obey. The best service we can render to humanity is to show it what these famous leaders are worth, so as to drive out veneration through disgust. Ideas will be better served when men are served less.

Louise Levi

Several of our subscribers, of modest means, have asked us whether it was useful to send to M. Pierre Quillard, 10, rue Nollet, Paris, seventeenth arrondissement, the adhesion whose formula we published on page 157. I am not suspected of loving vain demonstrations. If therefore we published this formula in the cahier, it is because the adhesion was effective. The affairs of Armenia, Romania, Russia, and Finland are among those where what is called French opinion carries some weight. It is moreover evident that the body of our subscribers forms an important part of French opinion. Finally, as socialists, we do not accept that the modesty of one’s situation should be an impediment to the expression of a free opinion.

Our long-standing subscribers know that our cahiers do not appear during the vacations; or, to speak more precisely, our cahiers appear in series, and the series begin and end with the school year. We ask those of our subscribers from the provinces who will be passing through Paris during the vacations to kindly come see us at the office of the cahiers, 8, rue de la Sorbonne. A quarter-hour conversation advances the work more than the longest correspondence. I shall be at the cahiers every Thursday from eight o’clock to eleven o’clock and from one o’clock to seven o’clock, except from August 25 to September 20, when I shall be doing my twenty-eight days of military service. During the first week of the vacations, when traveling is most frequent, from July 28 to August 2, I shall be permanently at the cahiers office, every day, at the same hours.

We ask our subscribers to kindly indicate to us without delay, if they can, to what address exactly we shall have to send them the cahiers of the fourth series; it is in fact during the vacations that we prepare the address labels for all the mailings of the following series. We prefer, for the good administration of our mailings, to have on our lists the home address in town rather than the address at the lycee, college, school, or office.

We ask our subscribers to kindly continue during the vacations their monthly subscriptions, at least equal in amount; it is in fact during the vacations that our small budgets become most flexible.

We ask our subscribers to kindly use their vacation travels to find us new subscribers; we are in a position to send complete third series at the price of the ordinary subscription.

This cahier, as Guieysse has said, and the tenth cahier of the third series, were produced to bring our subscribers up to date on the current situation, as it presented itself at the beginning of the school year 1901-1902, after the period of formation. To keep our subscribers informed, we shall publish reports whenever there are truly new elements.

Jean Deck

Memoir and Documents

Cahiers de la Quinzaine appearing twenty times per year Paris 8, rue de la Sorbonne, ground floor

We put this cahier into commerce; we sell it for three francs fifty.

We have published by the same author, in the seventeenth cahier of the third series, a Courier from Finland.

For Finland

Bibliographical Notes

Even restricting the Finnish question to the current political conflict, the bibliography would be too long for me to give it here in full. Moreover, the works that treat the question are for the most part written in languages little known in France, even by the educated public. I shall limit myself to indicating the principal works suited to orienting those who might wish to study the question more closely. I would add that a nearly complete bibliography has appeared in:

1. Finnlandische Rundschau, first year. Leipzig, Duncker und Humblot, 1901, pages 190-174, 251-254 and 334-338; as well as in the pamphlet by:

2. Boris Minzes: Staatsstreich in Finnland und nationalrussische Eroberungspolitik. Berlin, Felber, 1899. [Minzes cites only works in German, English, French, or Russian.]

I. --- General Works

There exist two general histories of Finland, both translated into German:

3. Yrjo Koskinen: Finnische Geschichte von den fruhesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart. Leipzig, Duncker und Humblot, 1874, viii+636 pages [original in Finnish].

4. M. G. Schybergson: Geschichte Finnlands. Deutsche Bearbeitung von Fritz Arnheim. Gotha, Perthes, 1896, xxiv+663 pages. [Goes up to 1894; original in Swedish, second Swedish edition in course of publication.]

The geography of the country is presented in the work published by the Geographical Society of Finland:

5. Atlas de Finlande, Helsingfors, 1899: an atlas of 32 folio sheets and a text volume of 479 pages [Number 17 of Fennia, Bulletin of the Society].

The economic conditions are presented in the:

6. Notices sur la Finlande, published on the occasion of the Universal Exposition in Paris in 1900, Direction de l’industrie. This publication, which naturally betrays a certain official optimism, can be supplemented or corrected by:

7. N. G. Frederiksen: La Finlande. Economie publique et privee. Paris, Societe nouvelle de librairie et d’edition, 1902, one volume, 438 pages. [Published first in Danish. The French edition is revised and corrected on certain points.]

On the constitution and constitutional questions, one may consult the following works:

8. La Constitution du Grand-Duche de Finlande. Paris, Societe nouvelle de librairie et d’edition, 1900, one volume, 199 pages. [Contains the texts of the constitutional laws, with a commentary on the two oldest.]

9. L. Mechelin: Precis du droit public du Grand-Duche de Finlande. Paris, Guillaumin, 1886. [The work is out of print; its content is taken up in the following.]

10. L. Mechelin: Das Staatsrecht des Grossfurstentums Finnland in Marquardsens Handbuch des offentlichen Rechts IV, 1, 1. Freiburg im Breisgau, Morf, 1889.

11. R. Hermanson: Ein Beitrag zur Beurteilung der staatsrechtlichen Stellung des Grossfurstentums Finnland. Leipzig, Duncker und Humblot, 1900, a pamphlet. [Summary of a Swedish-language work by the same author on “The Public Law of Finland.” The doctrine is on certain points different from that of M. Mechelin.]

Finally, a special place must be given to two major collaborative works treating the whole of Finnish life:

12. La Finlande au dix-neuvieme siecle. Described and illustrated by a group of Finnish writers and artists. Second edition, Helsingfors, Edlund, 1900, one volume, 386 folio pages.

13. D. Protopopoff [and others]: Finljandja. Saint Petersburg, Horovoi, 1898, one volume, 480 pages [in Russian].

A. --- First Polemics up to 1899.

The book that gave rise to them is the Russian work of:

14. K. Ordine: Pokorenje Finljandij. [The Conquest of Finland] Saint Petersburg, 1899, to which replied:

15. J. R. Danielsson: Finnlands Vereinigung mit dem Russischen Reiche. Helsingfors, Weilin et Goos, 1891, one volume, 199 pages [translated from the second edition of the Swedish original]. There also exists an English translation published in Borga in 1891: Finland’s Union with the Russian Empire.

Among the Russian works or pamphlets, it suffices to cite:

16. Th. Jeleneff: Les pretentions des separatistes finlandais. Apercu critique de la doctrine separatiste en Finlande, Paris, 1895, and

17. P.-J. Messaroch: Finljandja. --- Gosudarstvo ili russkaja okraina? [Is Finland a State or a Russian Province?], Saint Petersburg, 1897 [distinguished by the ardor of its anti-Finnish sentiments].

One will find moreover information on the action of the committees gathered in Saint Petersburg during the period 1890-1898 in:

18. Reponse a la brochure officielle “Le manifeste imperial du 3 fevrier 1899,” 70 pages [not for sale].

B. --- The February 1899 Manifesto and Its Immediate Consequences

a) Juridical commentaries.

A great number of French and foreign jurists have pronounced on this question. One cannot cite them all here. Three pamphlets in German appeared in Leipzig, at Duncker, in 1900, by Conrad Bornhak, B. Getz (translated from the Norwegian), and C. V. Nyholm (translated from the Danish).

An excellent book appeared in England:

19. J. R. Fisher. Finland and the Tsars 1809-1899. London, Edward Arnold, second revised edition, 1900.

In the French language, let us cite, in addition to the Reponse (number 18):

20. Frantz Despagnet: La question finlandaise au point de vue juridique. Paris, Larose, 1901, 84 pages [with the endorsement of thirteen professors of international law].

21. L. Michoud and A. de Lapradelle. La question finlandaise. Laval, Barneoud, 1901, 797 pages.

22. W. Van der Vlugt. Le conflit finlandais, envisage au point de vue juridique. Paris, edition de l’Humanite nouvelle, 1900, 208 pages [translated from the Dutch].

Finally, articles appeared in the principal French and foreign law reviews in 1899 and 1900.

b) On the events themselves.

23. Le coup d’Etat en Finlande. Leipzig, Friedrich, 1899, 64 pages.

24. Rene Puaux. Pour la Finlande, with a preface by Anatole France. Paris, Stock, 1899 [with a good introduction summarizing the history of Finland, and the full text of the manifesto and of the acts, petitions, and speeches to which it gave rise].

25. Madame Bernardini. Le droit des faibles: la Finlande. Revue de Paris, 1899.

26. Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu. La Russie, la Finlande et la conference de la Haye. Revue des Revues, 1899.

The international addresses were reproduced in facsimile in a luxury publication:

27. Pro Finlandia [Stockholm and] Berlin, Mertz, 1899, 130 folio pages.

The history of the international deputation is told in:

28. W. Van der Vlugt. Pour la Finlande. Paris, edition de l’Humanite nouvelle, 1900, 132 pages [translated from the Dutch].

C. --- The Diet of 1899 and the Military Law.

The principal document is:

29. Diete de Finlande en 1899. Reponses des Etats aux propositions imperiales concernant le service militaire personnel. Translated from the official Swedish text. Paris, Societe nouvelle de librairie et d’edition, 1900, one volume, 296 pages.

Of this reply, also published in German and English translations, a sort of summary was published:

30. Das Recht Finnlands und seine Wehrpflichtfrage. Eine kurze, aktenmassige Betrachtung von einem finnlandischen Juristen. Leipzig, Duncker und Humblot, 1900, 60 pages.

D. --- On the Whole of the Events of 1899.

A complete account of these events, drawn from reliable sources, is found in a Swedish work:

31. Ur Finlands nyaste Historia (Recent Events in Finland). Stockholm, Wahlstrom et Widstrand, 1900-1901, 2 volumes.

A special periodical founded in England:

32. Finland. An English journal devoted to the cause of the Finnish people. Edited by C. Harold Perrott. London, Sinepkin, June 1899-June 1900, 11 issues, contains a wealth of interesting and well-informed reports.

In addition, numerous review articles appeared in France (Leon Denis and Vandervelde in l’Humanite nouvelle, 1899; J. de Coussanges in la Quinzaine, 1899; Julien Leclercq in le Mercure de France, 1900; Jean Deck in Le Mouvement Socialiste, 1899, etc.) and in England (in 1899 and 1900 in the Fortnightly Review, Contemporary Review, National Review, Nineteenth Century, etc.).

E. --- Events since 1900.

The most complete and generally best-informed collection of facts is a journal written in Swedish, published in Stockholm:

33. Fria Ord. (Free Words.) Stockholm, Bostrom, 1900 and following, 66 issues published. [Two series of 20 issues published; the third in course of publication.] The journal has no fixed periodicity.

34. The Finnlandische Rundschau (see number 1) must also be mentioned [the second year in course of publication].

In addition, at even more irregular dates, and since the spring of 1900, three journals have been published:

35. Chronique de Finlande, Paris, Imprimerie Lhen, 15 issues published.

36. Finnlandische Korrespondenz, Erlangen, Jakob, 6 issues published. [These two journals not for sale.]

37. The Finland Bulletin, London. [This journal is for sale.]

Among the review articles, the following should be cited:

In Le Mouvement Socialiste, two reports by Jean Deck (August 1900 and May 1902) and one by Rene Puaux (1901, somewhat pessimistic);

In Pages Libres, an article by Rene Puaux (January 4, 1902);

In l’Effort of 1900 and 1901, several articles by Rene Puaux and Jean Deck (in particular an article on the press, and a referendum on the Finnish question).

Introduction

The Conquest of Finland

Finland is placed by its geographical situation between two states, one of which, Sweden, early expanded beyond the Scandinavian peninsula toward the south and east, while the other, Russia, has sought since the beginning of modern times an outlet toward Europe --- that is, to the west. Finland was almost fatally destined to become the object of the covetousness of these two empires, to be the arena where their quarrels would be settled, and finally to remain the conquest of the stronger. This is indeed the summary of its history. (1)

Historical circumstances first favored Sweden, which from the twelfth century began to take possession of the country, where Finnish tribes had settled. The conquest, Swedish colonization, and conversion to Christianity marched in step. In the sixteenth century the country, which constituted a distinct province, received the title of Grand Duchy (Storfurstendome). In the seventeenth century, the governor-general Per Brahe founded the University of Abo (1) (1640) and displayed in his administration a beneficent activity.

At that time, moreover, the wars with Russia had already begun. The first was fortunate for Sweden, which by the Treaty of Stolbova (1617) acquired advanced positions on the Gulf of Finland (in particular Ingria).

The misfortunes of the country began with Charles XII. He despised his Russian adversary, Peter the Great, too much. The defeat of Narva (1700) did not discourage the tsar, who took advantage of Charles XII’s absence in Poland to seize Ingria and found his capital there (1705). It was evident that Russia would henceforth be led to conquer the countries situated on the shore of the Gulf of Finland, to make the position of Saint Petersburg more secure. One of the Russian ministers currently in power said in June 1899 to a Frenchman who had come to study the Finnish question: “It is impossible for us to have a frontier 40 kilometers from our capital.” The answer is of more than doubtful accuracy for that date; but in 1703 it would have expressed the actual state of affairs. Russian armies soon penetrated into Finland. This was the period known as the “Great War” (stora ofreden). The ravages committed by the Russians were appalling. Almost all the factories, (2) almost all the castles were devastated. The Peace of Nystad (1721) consecrated Russia’s victory, which, in addition to Estonia, Livonia, and Ingria, gained part of Karelia (the south and east of the present province of Viborg).

In 1741 war broke out again between the two countries. Finland was again invaded and ravaged, and the Treaty of Abo (1743) ceded to Russia new territories to the west and northwest of those acquired in 1721.

The decline of Sweden and the intrigues of the parties finally provoked energetic measures on the part of the king. Gustavus III, through the coup d’etat of 1772, restored the royal power that had been greatly diminished during the period of aristocratic government that followed the death of Charles XII. This coup d’etat resulted in the promulgation of a constitutional act defining the rights and limits of the royal power, the Form of Government of August 21, 1772. This document, important in the history of Sweden, is even more so for Finland; for it was destined, following the Russian conquest, to remain the fundamental charter of the country. It renewed in almost all its provisions the Form of Government of 1680, itself born of the absolutist coup d’etat of Charles XI. (1) It is not without purpose to note the character of this act; this is no doubt what explains to some extent that the Russian autocracy believed it could accommodate itself to it in governing Finland.

Meanwhile a curious change was taking place in people’s minds in Finland since the last wars. The memory of the ravages inflicted by the Russians and of the powerlessness of the Swedes to prevent them was still vivid. Moreover, the feeling was gradually emerging that Finland constituted a quite distinct province, and above all a separate ethnic group. It is from the mid-eighteenth century that the awakening of Finnish consciousness dates; and although the direction of affairs was entirely in the hands of the Swedish element, people were already beginning to demand that knowledge of Finnish be required of candidates for public office in Finland. There were no doubt indications of an orientation toward administrative autonomy. A memory from the last war could still nourish these ideas. The tsarina Elizabeth had indeed published on March 18, 1742, a proclamation in which she offered her support to the Finns, in the event that they wished to erect their country into an independent state serving as a buffer between the two empires. (1)

It is to the realization of this plan that a man who exercised a very perceptible influence on Finland’s destinies long worked: Sprengtporten. Sprengtporten had helped Gustavus III in his coup d’etat; but he soon became an enemy of the king. Retired to Finland in 1781, he surrounded himself with a circle of political friends who dreamed, like him, of Finland’s autonomy. They first turned to the Duke of Sudermanie, brother of Gustavus (the future Charles XIII), offering him the crown of Finland. The duke refused to embark on this adventure. Sprengtporten left his homeland and entered the Russian service (1787). The following year Gustavus III engaged, without the advice of the diet, in a war against Russia. The theater, as always, was Finland. The occasion seemed propitious to Sprengtporten’s friends for realizing their plans. Setbacks at the beginning had irritated the troops; a sort of conspiracy was formed to enter into negotiations without the king’s knowledge (the Anjala conspiracy). The negotiator sent took it upon himself to propose to Catherine II that she resume and carry out Elizabeth’s intentions. Despite Sprengtporten’s support, he was not heeded. For their part, the conspirators abandoned him. The sole result of this conspiracy was the promulgation by Gustavus III, on April 3, 1789, of an Act of Union and Security that reinforced the king’s power and diminished that of the diet. This act has remained one of the constitutional laws of the country. (1) The Peace of Warala (1789) restored the status quo. (2)

The moment of conquest was approaching. The weakness and incapacity of King Gustavus IV of Sweden, and the upheavals produced in Europe by Napoleonic ambition, hastened an event that was no doubt inevitable; at the meeting at Tilsit, it was agreed that if Sweden refused to adhere to the Continental Blockade, Russia would undertake to force it; as the price of this service, Napoleon abandoned Finland to Muscovite covetousness.

During the winter of 1807, Alexander I prepared the campaign, which began in the first months of 1808. The history of the Finnish campaign (1808-1809) has been written several times, both by Finns and by Russians. The interest of this period resides above all in the interpretation of the attitude of the tsar, of the Finnish diet, and of the acts that created the present regime. It is there indeed that the center of the debate lies; and the discussion raises a host of questions of public law and even of international law. I shall not enter into it. I am not competent in these matters; a great number of specialists have pronounced. Moreover, I believe that at the present time, for the public interested in the Finnish cause, the purely juridical question --- the interpretation of treaties a century old --- is of secondary importance. But one conclusion emerges with clarity from the debate: one cannot quibble over either the meaning or the value of the guarantee given by Alexander I.

The emperor found himself divided during the course of the campaign between three influences: that of Sprengtporten, that of Arakcheev, minister of war, and that of the liberal Speransky. Sprengtporten wished once again to try to realize Elizabeth’s idea and form an independent Finland, to which Russia would even return Karelia, taken in 1721 and 1743. Arakcheev and the military proposed a pure and simple conquest. Speransky was in favor of a very broad autonomy, leaving Finland its Swedish constitution.

Given the weakness of the tsar, his susceptibility to outside influences, and on the other hand his desire for liberalism, the memories of his education, it was difficult to foresee which party would prevail. In fact, the tsar’s attitude varied; and the works of Finnish historians have demonstrated that these variations were provoked by circumstances.

The beginning of the campaign was successful; the great fortress of the south, Sveaborg (facing Helsingfors), capitulated early. The military gained the upper hand; and in a declaration to the Powers, dated March 16, 1808, Alexander spoke of Finland as a “province conquered by arms.” But things soon changed. The people, who were being forced to swear an oath to the tsar, began a partisan war; the Finnish troops, though abandoned by Sweden, regained the advantage in the summer of 1808. The campaign threatened to drag on. On the other hand, the meeting at Erfurt had been far from tightening the Napoleonic friendship; the prospect of a war with France was already becoming likely; and it could be ruinous for Russia to have at its gates a province not yet conquered, or ready to revolt at the favorable moment. Prudence joined liberalism in counseling a return to Sprengtporten’s ideas. A manifesto of June 5/17, 1808, promised Finland the guarantee of its privileges and a prompt convocation of the diet. First, a deputation traveled to Petersburg and expressed the wishes of the country (November). Sprengtporten, who had become governor-general, and Speransky, charged with reporting on Finnish affairs, worked in the same direction. On February 1, 1809, the Diet of Borga was convoked. (1)

It opened on March 27. Emperor Alexander had come in person. On the 29th, before the assembled estates in the cathedral, he had Sprengtporten read his act of guarantee of Finnish laws, conceived as follows:

Act of guarantee of His Imperial Majesty to all the inhabitants of Finland; given at Borga, the 15/27 March 1809.

We Alexander I, Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russias, Grand Duke of Finland, etc., etc., etc., make known: The will of the Most High having brought Us into possession of the Grand Duchy of Finland, We have wished by the present instrument to confirm and sanction the religion and the fundamental laws of the country as well as the rights and privileges which each Estate in particular, in the said Grand Duchy, and all its inhabitants in general, both great and small, have enjoyed up to now by virtue of the Constitutions. We promise to maintain all these advantages and laws in full vigor without alteration or change. In witness whereof We have signed the present act of guarantee with Our own hand.

Given at Borga, the 15/27 March 1809.

The original is signed by the hand of His Majesty

Alexander

After the reading of this act, the estates swore the oath of fidelity to the tsar. There was therefore a sort of contract. What confirms this, moreover, are the following terms in the preamble of an ordinance of April 4:

Having assembled the Estates of Finland in a general Diet, and received their oaths of fidelity, We wished on this occasion, by a solemn act issued in their presence and proclaimed in the sanctuary of the Supreme Being, to confirm and assure the maintenance of the Religion, the fundamental laws, the rights, and the privileges which each Estate in particular and all the inhabitants of Finland in general have enjoyed up to now.

In promulgating this act by these presents, We believe it Our duty to instruct at the same time Our faithful subjects of Finland that, in conforming to the ancient and revered custom of this country, We regard the oaths of fidelity sworn by the estates in general and by the deputies of the peasants in particular, in their name and in that of their constituents, of their own free and spontaneous movements, as good and binding for all the inhabitants of Finland.

What followed, and in particular the speech delivered by the tsar at the closing of the diet on July 7 (“henceforth placed in the rank of nations, under the empire of its laws,” he said in speaking of the Finnish people), may be passed over in silence here.

An objection has been raised against the ceremony of March 29: that Finland, not yet having been ceded by Sweden, did not have the legal standing to commit itself in this way.

But two observations must be made:

1. Sweden had done nothing to defend Finland. Since the military convention of November 19, 1808, Swedish troops had even evacuated the country. There was therefore an abandonment in fact.

2. The loss of Finland had brought about the dethronement of Gustavus IV. As soon as the Duke of Sudermanie convoked an extraordinary diet. That of Borga had not yet opened. Yet the Swedish government did not summon the Finnish estates to the Swedish diet --- a summons that would have remained entirely platonic but that would have had the value of a formal claim. This was implicitly to renounce Finland. Moreover, in Article 14 of the Treaty of Fredrikshamn, which ceded Finland to Russia, Sweden implicitly sanctioned the Act of Borga at the same time as it invoked it.

On the other hand, the Russian polemicists, in their discussion of the juridical question, deny that the promises of Alexander I have the meaning and value that the Finns attribute to them. (1)

a) On the meaning. --- The words “constitution” and “fundamental laws” could not have, and did not have for Alexander I, they say, the meaning of constitutional laws in the modern sense of the word. The tsar would have guaranteed only the laws determining the legal status of the four classes or estates of the country.

The answer has often been made. --- Let us frankly acknowledge that Alexander I, in his liberal period, readily employed the word “constitution,” and that one could, with bad faith, quibble on this point. One could at a stretch claim that the desire to ease the transition may have led to exaggeration of certain expressions in public acts and speeches. But there are secret acts that can leave no doubt as to the meaning of the terms employed by the tsar.

1. A secret report from Speransky to the emperor, (1) where Speransky says that Finland is “a State, not a province,” and where he speaks of the “limitations” that the autocratic power imposed upon itself in Finland;

2. A secret memorandum written by Alexander to the governor-general, dated September 14/26, 1810. At that date, Bernadotte had been chosen as crown prince of Sweden; he could be suspected of wanting to retake Finland, and the tsar indicated to the governor (Baron Steinheil) the line of conduct to follow. He said, among other things (2):

In settling the situation of Finland, I intended to give this people a political existence, such that it should not regard itself as conquered by Russia, but as attached to it by the bond of its obvious interests: that is why

1. Not only its civil laws, but its political laws have been maintained.

One can accept neither that the minister wanted to deceive his sovereign, nor that the tsar wanted to deceive the governor.

b) On the value. --- With a certain cynicism, Russian writers often declare that the promises and declarations of Alexander I are merely “phrases,” that he did not commit himself as autocrat, and that the Act of Borga cannot bind the Russian government. It is easy to respond:

1. That the collection of Russian laws implicitly recognizes that Finland occupies a special place in the empire. The General Code says indeed (volume I, 1, section 1, paragraph 4): “Inseparable from the imperial throne of all the Russias are: the throne of the Kingdom of Poland and that of the Grand Duchy of Finland.” The assimilation to Poland, which the Treaties of Vienna (1815) guaranteed a constitution of its own, is singularly conclusive.

2. That one cannot suspect Alexander I and Speransky, in the secret acts just cited, of having wanted to play comedy.

3. That it is serious, on the part of the defenders of autocracy, to argue that a tsar may have made “phrases.” A constitutional sovereign may deliver speeches which, for want of ratification by Parliament, remain phrases; an autocrat, by definition, legislates when he speaks officially. An autocratic regime can live only on a mystical belief in the infallibility and absolute value of the sovereign’s words. To invite subjects to distinguish between oaths of guarantee that are legal contracts and others that are mere phrases is to remove from absolutism its surest foundation. (1)

But there is further proof that Alexander I really wished to assure Finland autonomy and a constitutional regime. The part of Finland conquered at the treaties of Nystad and Abo had fallen into a state of profound decay: bad administration, bad justice, violence of the landlords to whom Peter and his successors had given vast territories. (1) As early as 1802, a commission had been established to study the means of reviving this province, then called Finland. The ukase establishing this commission (May 19, 1802, old style) contains a preamble worth citing:

Since the union of Finland with Russia, various systems have been tried with a view to improving the economic situation of this country, a condition for the progress of the people; but, to Our great sorrow, We see that this territory is now in a situation so lamentable that it does not differ much from that in which the country was at the time of the conquest.

The conquest of 1809 offered a solution. Alexander I had been able, in a journey through Finland, to compare the results of the Russian and Swedish systems. He decided to unite “Old Finland” (the name given to the conquests of 1721-43) with the rest of the Grand Duchy. The manifesto is dated December 31, 1811. In the preamble, the drafter had put: “Having by virtue of Our Manifesto of December 11, 1811, united the Government of Viborg, incorporated into Our Empire; etc.”

The emperor struck out with his own hand on the draft the words “incorporated into Our Empire.” (2)

Finland up to 1890

The Constitution of Finland had been guaranteed by Alexander I. A new period was opening for the country. The tsar soon reaped the fruits of his political moderation. Finland thrived under its autonomous situation; during the war against Napoleon, Finnish volunteers ensured the guard of Saint Petersburg.

But one could soon see the principal defect of Finland’s political situation. The functioning of the constitution depended in the end on the will of the tsar to keep the promise he had made. Alexander did not keep his. He had entrusted the supreme administration of the country to a Council of Regency. In 1816, he transformed this council into an Imperial Senate, by an ordinance dated February 9/21, whose preamble recalled the constitutional guarantee of 1809. (1) But the diet was not convoked, even after the final fall of Napoleon had restored peace to Europe. It seems incontestable to me that the general reactionary movement in Russia must bear the blame. Speransky had fallen from grace, following intrigues in which a Finn, Gustave Armfelt, a former favorite of Gustavus III, took part --- a grave and perhaps fatal error. Armfelt, who had become Minister of Finland, was conservative and does not appear to have done much to use his personal influence in favor of a convocation of the diet. The tsar seems to have had the intention of having the constitutional provisions codified into a draft law to be submitted to the diet. But there was no diet, and, naturally, none under Nicholas I either.

There is here something to give a semblance of justification to the anti-Finnish party. But it must be noted that, in a certain sense, the reactionary tsars respected the constitutional rights. The fundamental laws specified indeed the legislative domains where the vote of the diet was necessary to create, abrogate, or modify the laws. So long as the diet was not convoked, legislation on all these points could therefore not be modified by a unilateral act of the government. Alexander I and Nicholas I did not touch these laws. On the other hand, at the accession of Nicholas I, the governor-general Zakrevsky advised him against renewing Alexander I’s act of guarantee. The tsar refused to follow this advice; he confirmed the guarantee given by his brother; and all his successors, including the present sovereign, have followed this example. (1) An objection against Finland’s rights, drawn from the state of affairs from 1809 to 1855, thus lacks probative force.

The renaissance of the constitutional regime, the application of the constitution, was the work of Alexander II. It answered an urgent need. The growing malaise resulting from the bureaucratic regime and the cessation of all legislative reform decided the emperor, who was rather liberal in his tendencies, to convoke the Finnish diet. On June 18, 1863, the edict of convocation was published; on September 18, the emperor in person (1) opened the diet with a speech delivered in French, in which he announced a whole program of reforms, in particular a codification of the constitutional laws:

Several of the stipulations of the fundamental laws of the Grand Duchy are no longer applicable to the state of affairs that has arisen since its union with the Empire: others lack clarity and precision. Wishing to remedy these imperfections, My intention is to have a draft law prepared that will contain explanations and supplements to these stipulations, to be submitted for examination by the Estates at the next Diet, which I intend to convoke in three years. In maintaining the constitutional Monarchical principle inherent in the customs of the Finnish people and of which all its laws and institutions bear the character, I wish to have admitted in this draft a more extended right than that which the Estates already possess regarding the regulation of the assessment of taxes, as well as the right of motion which they formerly possessed, reserving however to Myself the right to take the initiative in all questions touching upon changes in the fundamental law.

[The text continues with an enormously detailed account of every phase of the Finnish constitutional crisis from 1890 to 1902, covering: the first attacks on the Finnish constitution (Chapter I); the military question and the February 1899 manifesto (Chapter II); the promulgation of the manifesto and the great address with 524,931 signatures (Chapter III); the Diet of 1899 and its response (Chapter IV); the internal administration from 1898 to 1900 including press suppression, the appointment of Bobrikoff as governor-general, and the international address campaign (Chapter V); the manifestes of 1900 on the Russian language, freedom of assembly, and Russian peddlers, plus the military law of 1901 suppressing the Finnish army (Chapter VI); the resistance to the military law including clerical refusal to read the law from the pulpit, the second great address with 473,363 signatures, the disbandment of Finnish battalions, and the conscription crisis of 1902 where 58.9% of conscripts refused to present themselves (Chapter VII); the latest events including the language ordinances and upcoming questions on schools, customs, and diet reform (Chapter VIII); and a conclusion noting the determination of the Russian government to pursue its work of destruction, the massive emigration from Finland, and the necessity of continued resistance.]

Note on Dates

In the cahier that has just been read, a fairly large number of dates are given in both styles; in that case there remains no uncertainty; whenever the dates are given in only one style, and it is the old style, the author has taken care to indicate this expressly; whenever the dates are given in only one style, and there is no indication, they should be read in the new style.

One passes from one style to the other by counting that the Russian calendar, of the old style, is behind the Latin calendar, of the new style (Gregorian), by twelve days until the end of February 1900 and by thirteen days from the beginning of March 1900.

Table of Contents

Bibliographical Notes The Conquest of Finland Finland up to 1890 The Finnish Question Chapter I. --- From 1890 to 1898; the first attempts against the Finnish constitution Chapter II. --- The military question; the manifesto of February 1899 Chapter III. --- The promulgation of the manifesto; the great address Chapter IV. --- The Diet of 1899 Chapter V. --- The internal administration from 1898 to 1900 Chapter VI. --- The manifestes of 1900 and 1901; the administration in 1900 and 1901; the military law of 1901 a). --- The restriction of the freedom of the press and of assembly b). --- The russification of Finnish administrations c). --- Reorganization of the police d). --- The suppression of Finnish postage stamps Chapter VII. --- The resistance to the military law; the conscription call of 1902 Chapter VIII. --- The latest events; upcoming questions a) the school question b) the customs question c) the reform of the diet d) other questions Conclusion