De la situation faite à la défense militaire
On the Situation Facing Military Defense of France
Georges Picquart
All that one needs to know about the Algeciras conference is exactly what the civic bearing and military composure of France are in the face of the danger that has not ceased to threaten us.
I sometimes hear it said — and I am told it is one of Jaures’s ways of speaking — at the Thursday gatherings of the Cahiers, I hear it said — but everyone knows well enough that the Thursday gatherings of the Cahiers exercise no authority of command or influence over the course of this institution — that the affairs of Morocco are financial affairs. This is what is nowadays called somewhat conveniently the materialism of history.
If one means that there are financial affairs in the affairs of Morocco, that is possible, that is probable, that is even certain. That was certain and known a priori, for there are everywhere, today, financial affairs. But when one has said that, one has said nothing, precisely because there are everywhere, today, financial affairs.
I go further: the financiers, who are themselves parasites, can only live on the condition of parasitizing some reality. If there were no currency, there would be no paper money. If there had never been some gold mine in reality, there could never have been any financial operation, even a fictitious one, on gold mines.
When therefore one says that there are financial affairs in Morocco, one speaks truly, but has said nothing. When one says that if we fight we will fight for the financiers, one lies, for it is at once perfectly true, on the one hand, that there are financiers, and on the other hand, that if we fight, it will not be for the causes of the financiers.
In truth it will be for entirely different causes than those of the financiers. The financiers form here only a fragile veneer of parasitism.
We have rigorously forbidden ourselves to speak of these causes in these cahiers before the ordinary completion of this seventh series. We have forbidden ourselves until then to speak as dialecticians of the danger that has not ceased to threaten us. We have forbidden ourselves until then to combat as dialecticians the detestable Herveist demagoguery. Under the invocation of Louis de Gonzague we have resolved to bring this seventh series to its full completion as if nothing were amiss.
The studies that follow were published for the first time in the Aurore, more or less regularly two or three times a month. Too few people had read them in the Aurore. We are particularly happy to gather them today in a cahier. We reproduce them exactly as they appeared, at their date, with their date. Colonel Picquart was kind enough to reread his proofs. Whatever the intrinsic value of these articles, a capital part of their value and importance comes from the exact date at which they were first published. The first of these articles is dated Tuesday, June 13, 1905, that is to say from the very moment when the crisis that has not ceased to threaten us had just appeared.
It is a great honor for our cahiers to publish this cahier. If nothing breaks before the moment when we begin again to speak as dialecticians of these grave events, I hope that I shall be able to show that it was we who were the pacifists, in the most literal sense of the word, and that we were the direct lineage of the old Dreyfusism; and that the Herveist demagoguery, on the contrary, is perhaps what most contributed to creating a real danger of war; and that it is a perversion, a counterfeit, and an inversion of the old Dreyfusism.
Charles Peguy
TWO ARMIES
THE FRENCH ARMY — Tuesday, June 13, 1905
The difficulties that the Moroccan question creates for our diplomacy have given rise in France, in certain circles, to fits of nervousness which, though habitual among us in similar circumstances, are no less unfortunate.
People have asked whether, in the event that our disagreements with Germany should intensify, we would be ready for any eventuality. More or less sincere voices have been raised to denounce the poor use of the billions devoted for so many years to the work of national defense, and to emphasize the state of inferiority in which we are placed by the moral crisis the army is undergoing.
As always, one must here make allowance for the exaggerations inspired by political passion. As soon as a danger appears on the horizon, the adversaries of the established regime hasten to profit from it to incriminate the institutions they have an interest in combating. But it is undeniable that there was something more. The emotion was born not only from the clamors raised by the enemies of the Republic. An apprehension has spread in the very ranks of the republicans, just at the moment when the greatest composure is not only necessary but also fully justified.
Inclined to extremes, we have the bad habit in France of passing with incredible ease from excess of confidence to a complete distrust of our forces.
Our military situation with regard to Germany is not, however, such as to justify such exaggerations.
Moltke often said it: “Everything that money can give, the French army possesses; for the rest, one has the right to make reservations.”
The old marshal’s assertions are still accurate today.
We possess excellent artillery equipment. Our infantry weapon is comparable to the best rifles of foreign armies. Our war supplies have been calculated with a prodigality that may allow us to overlook the partial and momentary shortfalls sometimes reported at this or that point in the territory. Our industry is equipped to powerfully aid the military administration in case of mobilization. Our railway network is organized to permit a rapid concentration of troops. Our fortified positions are formidable; they are equipped with everything needed to ensure an energetic defense.
Without doubt Germany outdistances us in terms of numbers. Its population of more than 56 million inhabitants leaves far behind our 39 million. However, until now, this difference has not led to giving the forces of the German army a superiority as considerable as one might imagine. On the peacetime footing, Germany maintains in round numbers 24,000 officers and 600,000 non-commissioned officers and soldiers, while France has under arms 24,000 officers and about 550,000 non-commissioned officers and soldiers (including colonial troops stationed in the metropolis). Germany has 23 army corps; France has 21.
The question of numbers therefore has nothing particularly alarming for us today. It is foreseeable, however, that it will worsen in the future.
Shall I speak of the French soldier? His qualities of suppleness, endurance, and ingenuity have long been known. No infantryman is more apt than ours for modern warfare, for combat in dispersed order, where individuality and initiative play so great a role.
The weak point of our military system lies, it must be admitted, in the command. From this point of view, the past still weighs heavily upon us. For thirty years, the recruitment of the soldier has become truly national. By contrast, the composition of the officer corps has undergone very few modifications. It is always the same lack of homogeneity stemming from a diversity of origin. Promotion by selection, which has too often become promotion by favoritism, determines careers.
Yet a resource allows us to face the future with confidence. A precious resource which escapes nations where command is the privilege of a caste: our country counts, in all social classes, enough intelligences and characters so that in the course of a long and bloody war the national army would be able to draw indefinitely from its own midst, as in the heroic times of the Revolution, the leaders it needs.
THE GERMAN ARMY — Wednesday, June 14, 1905
Since 1870, Germany’s military forces have increased in considerable proportions. The infantry has grown by a third; the artillery by about half. But the institutions themselves have scarcely changed. While on the ruins accumulated by our disasters we strove to construct a new edifice, the Germans contented themselves with perfecting a system that had allowed them to achieve victory.
Today the Germans are equipped roughly as we are. They have a good infantry rifle. But their field gun is not equal to ours. The German army of the first line is composed of the most robust elements of the nation. Men of second choice are called up in case of war only.
The soldier is admirably trained. Thanks to compulsory education, which is a reality in Germany, the regiment receives only already educated material. The officer corps is extremely homogeneous. It forms within the nation a very special caste. The practical instruction of the officers appears serious. The taste for responsibility is very well developed. Advancement by seniority is the rule, with the reservation that the officer recognized as incapable of reaching the next rank retires when his turn for promotion comes.
Some advantages are reserved for general staff officers, to enable them to reach the higher ranks more quickly. This exception is fully justified by the value of this elite corps which has become a model for all armies since Moltke brought it to the degree of perfection where it still stands today.
The German officer corps, solid and homogeneous as it appears to us, evidently constitutes one of the most serious elements of the army’s power, provided it is able to fulfill in all circumstances the duties incumbent upon it. But the exclusivism which, in certain cases, makes its strength can in other circumstances be for it a cause of weakness and ruin.